OPINION: State v. Sanchez

The Montana Supreme Court has issued an Opinion in the following matter:

DA 06-0052,

2008 MT 27,

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

RAUL C. SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

OPINION: State v. Tennell

The Montana Supreme Court has issued an Opinion in the following matter:

DA 06-0304,

2007 MT 266,

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

GARY CURTIS TENNELL,
Defendant and Appellant.

OPINION: State v. Racz

The Montana Supreme Court has issued an Opinion in the following matter:

DA 06-0219,

2007 MT 244,

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PAUL LASZLO RACZ,
Defendant and Appellant.

OPINION: State v. Misner

The Montana Supreme Court has issued an Opinion in the following matter:

05-385,

2007 MT 235,

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARK NEIL MISNER,

Defendant and Appellant.

OPINION: State v. Ariegwe

The Montana Supreme Court has issued an Opinion in the following matter:

04-620,

2007 MT 204,

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KINGSLEY AIRIEGWE,

Defendant and Appellant.

In this Opinion, the Court adopts a new approach to speedy trial claims and provides the following summary of its analysis:

For the convenience of the bench and bar, we are providing the following outline of our revised speedy trial test.

I. Factor One: The Length of the Delay

   A. Is the delay long enough to trigger the four-factor balancing test?

      1. When did the defendant become an accused?

      2. When is the defendant’s trial date?

      3. Is the interval between accusation and trial at least 200 days?

   B. To what extent does the delay stretch beyond the trigger date?

       1. The presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time; thus, as the delay gets longer, the quantum of proof that may be expected of the accused under Factor Four decreases, while the quantum of proof that may be expected of the State under Factor Four simultaneously increases.

      2. The State’s burden under Factor Two to justify the delay likewise increases with the length of the delay; thus, the further the delay stretches beyond the 200-day trigger date, the more compelling the State’s justifications under Factor Two must be.

II. Factor Two: The Reasons for the Delay

   A. Identify each period of delay in bringing the accused to trial.

   B. Attribute each period of delay to the appropriate party.

      1. The prosecution bears the burden of explaining the pretrial delays.

      2. Any delay not demonstrated to have been caused by the accused or affirmatively waived by the accused is attributed to the State by default.

   C. Assign weight to each period of delay based on the specific cause and culpability for the delay.

      1. Bad-faith delay, such as a deliberate attempt to gain a tactical advantage or to avoid trial, weighs heavily against the party that caused it.

      2. Negligence or lack of diligence in bringing the accused to trial occupies the middle ground on the culpability scale. It is weighed more lightly against the State than a deliberate attempt to hamper the defense, but it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun.

      3. Delay inherent in the criminal justice system and caused by circumstances largely beyond the control of the prosecutor and the accused is “institutional delay,” which is attributed to the State but weighs less heavily against the State than bad-faith delay and lack of diligence.

      4. Delay for “valid” reasons, such as a missing witness or a particularly complex charged offense, is weighed least heavily of all the types of delay.

III. Factor Three: The Accused’s Responses to the Delay

   A. Evaluate the accused’s responses to the delay—i.e., his or her acquiescence in and objections to pretrial delays—in light of the surrounding circumstances. Some considerations:

      1. The timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of the objections

      2. The reasons for the acquiescence

      3. Whether the accused was represented by counsel

      4. The accused’s pretrial conduct (as that conduct bears on the speedy trial right)

   B. The totality of the accused’s various responses to the delays in bringing him or her to trial is indicative of whether he or she actually wanted a speedy trial, which in turn informs the inquiry into whether there has been a deprivation of the right.

   C. The totality of the accused’s various responses to the delays also serves as a gauge of the weights the court should assign to the other three factors in the balancing.

IV. Factor Four: Prejudice to the Accused

   A. Was the pretrial incarceration oppressive, given the circumstances of that incarceration? Some considerations:

      1. Duration of the incarceration

      2. The complexity of the charged offense(s)

      3. Any misconduct on the part of the accused directly related to the pretrial incarceration

      4. The conditions of the incarceration

   B. Has the delay in bringing the accused to trial unduly prolonged the disruption of his or her life caused by the presence of unresolved criminal charges or aggravated the anxiety and concern that are inherent in being accused of a crime? Some considerations:

      1. Public scorn or obloquy; damage to reputation in the community

      2. Deprivation of employment

      3. Drain of financial resources or economic hardship

      4. Curtailment of associations

   C. Has the accused’s ability to present an effective defense been impaired by the delay? Some considerations: 

      1. The availability of witnesses and their ability to recall accurately events related to the charged offense(s)

      2. The accused’s ability to raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or produce specific items of evidence

      3. The length of the delay (excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify)

      4. The accused’s responses to the delay (the more imperiled the accused’s ability to present an effective defense becomes, the more likely he or she is to complain about the delay)

      5. The duration of the pretrial incarceration (an accused who is locked up is hindered in his or her ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his or her defense)

V. Balancing

   A. Given the length of the delay, the cause and culpability for each period of delay, the totality of the accused’s responses to the delay, the strength of the presumption of prejudice in the case, and the strength of the parties’ respective showings on the issue of prejudice, has the accused been deprived of his or her right to a speedy trial?

   B. None of the four factors is either a necessary or a sufficient condition to the legal conclusion that the accused has been deprived of the right. Rather, the four factors must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.